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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR)  
Colonel B. R. Brown, USA (ACSI)  
Captain G. K. Micodemus, USN (ONI)  
Colonel F. J. Cole, USAF (AFCIN 2B3)  
Colonel K. T. Gould, USA (J-2, The Joint Staff)  
Colonel Robert P. Halloran, USAF, Director of  
Operational Services, NSA  
Mr. Randolph V. Zander, Defense (OSO)

SUBJECT: NIE 12-61: THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES

1. The attached terms of reference are forwarded for review.
2. It is requested that your representative meet with us at 1000, Friday, 13 October, in Room 7E62 at the Langley building for written and/or oral contributions. This estimate is scheduled for USIB consideration on 2 November.

*Willard C. Matthias*

WILLARD C. MATTHIAS  
Acting Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 October 1961

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 12-61: THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES

THE PROBLEM

To assess the prospects for political and economic stability in the European Satellites, especially in relation to the Berlin crisis.

SCOPE

The last estimate done on the Satellites was NIE 12-59, "Political Stability in the European Satellites," dated 11 August 1959. Though there is thus some need for a more up-to-date estimate, present interest in the Satellites largely focusses on the effect of the Berlin crisis. We therefore propose, instead of treating internal political and economic developments in great detail, to discuss the chief trends, mainly in relation to the

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Berlin crisis. East Germany has been treated recently in SNIE 12.4-61, "Stability of East Germany in a Berlin Crisis," and SNIE 11-10-61, "Soviet Tactics in the Berlin Crisis." Since Albania's relations with the Bloc have been thoroughly treated in NIE 10-61, "Authority and Control in the Communist Movement," and will be covered in NIE 11-4-61, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1961-1966," we propose to mention it only briefly here, mainly in relation to political and economic developments within Albania.

#### QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

##### I. STABILITY OF THE REGIMES

###### A. Party Unity and Strength:

Evidences of factionalism; calibre of top leaders, cadres, rank-and-file; likelihood of succession problems; popularity of party.

###### B. Economic Situation and Short-Term Prospects:

Chief areas of achievement, main weaknesses; CEMA progress or evidence of lack of cooperation between countries.

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C. Popular Attitudes:

Alterations in traditional attitudes; accommodation with regimes; degree of continued antipathy to regimes; anti-Soviet attitudes, especially in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania.

II. REGIME RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND WITH EACH OTHER

A. Loyalty to and Control by USSR:

Mechanisms of control; evidences of attempts at independent actions; greater assertiveness; nationalist tendencies among leaders; pro-Yugoslav sympathies.

B. Military Relationships:

Functions of the Warsaw Pact.

C. The China Factor:

Extent of Chinese influence on regimes or elements in parties; sympathy for Chinese views; current relations with China.

D. Extent of Satellite Influence on the USSR:

Influence of the individual regimes (e.g., Ulbricht on Berlin and the Gomulka-Khrushchev relationship).

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E. Influence of the General Eastern European Situation on  
Soviet decisions:

Popular dissidence, reliability of regimes and apparatus  
of control.

### III. IMPACT OF THE BERLIN CRISIS IN EASTERN EUROPE

A. Attitudes of Satellite Governments Towards Issues Under  
Discussion in Negotiations:

Towards zonal disarmament proposals.

Anti-German Attitudes, especially in Poland and  
Czechoslovakia; attitudes towards Germans in DDR.

B. Fears of War and Current Reactions:

e.g., panic-buying; withdrawals of savings; other indica-  
tions of uneasiness; preparations for possible hostilities.

C. Behavior in the Event of War:

Military

1. Reliability of satellite armed and security forces.

Population

1. Likelihood of major difficulties for the USSR  
in any particular area.

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IV. EFFECT OF OUTCOME OF THE BERLIN CRISIS

A. If the Soviets are clearly frustrated:

Important effects on regime stability or popular attitudes.

B. If the Soviets make clear gains:

Results in relation to popular acceptance of regimes.

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